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Abstract 
This paper studies the link between economic performance and social 
networks in West Africa. Using first-hand data collected on 358 
small-scale traders in five border markets between Niger, Nigeria and 
Benin, we are particularly interested in testing whether the most well-
connected actors of trade networks are also the most successful in 
terms of monthly sales and profit. The paper shows that the overall 
economic performance of traders is affected by the socio-professional 
position of the actors with whom they are connected. While social ties 
with local religious leaders have no effect on their business, support 
received from civil servants, politicians, and security authorities 
translates into economic performance. The paper also shows 
significant differences between countries, regions and marketplaces. 
Social connections developed with state representatives have a much 
greater effect on economic performances in Niger and Benin than in 
Nigeria, where average profit is much higher. Experience is more 
closely correlated with profit in the region where traders have 
developed re-export trade activities than where petty trade is the 
dominant form of business. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Social networks play a crucial role in African economies. Unlike industrialized economies in 
which economic exchange is mainly based on impersonal transactions made possible by 
formal market institutions, African economies rely heavily on interpersonal relationships 
between entrepreneurs (Fafchamps 2004). Social networks allow entrepreneurs to develop 
trust relationships in a business environment where information transmission is slow and 
costly, access to credit is difficult, and contracts are not strictly enforced by formal 
institutions. While personal acquaintances are relatively unimportant in developed economies 
due to the predominance of arm-length ties between firms, trust acquired through repeated 
business transactions and interpersonal contacts strengthen the African entrepreneurs’ ability 
to adapt to unforeseen problems, and provide a better access to resources. In the particular 
field of trade, for example, social networks allow traders to do business with a larger number 
of suppliers, increase their access to capital and credit, and provide opportunities to build 
informal relationships with state officials that control imports and exports.  
 
Social networks, however, do not benefit all equally (Urwin et al. 2008). Because they rely 
primordially on trust, they tend to promote the well-connected rather than the most qualified. 
If membership in a network can compensate for market imperfections and increase 
productivity, it also creates or amplifies distortions in the labor market. Being too embedded 
in a set of interpersonal relationships may also have disadvantages because a high level of 
embeddedness decreases the ability of traders to reach actors beyond their own group. It also 
limits the possibilities of gains because every business partner provides more or less the same 
products or services. Much larger gains can accrue to less embedded actors, who can be 
potentially more complementary to each other, have different ideas and better exploit cultural 
or monetary differentials. The pressure from kin that goes with social obligations between 
network members in Africa can also be a threat to economic activities, pushing African 
entrepreneurs to evaluate the costs and benefits of developing social ties through kin. 
 
Against this background, the objective of this paper is to study the link between economic 
performance and social networks in five West African border markets. Using first-hand data 
collected on 358 small-scale traders located in Niger, Nigeria and Benin, we are particularly 
interested in testing whether the most well-connected actors of trade networks are also the 
most successful in terms of monthly sales and profit. In other words, we wish to determine 
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whether the overall economic performance of small-scale traders is affected by the socio-
professional position of the other actors with whom they are connected. 
 
The border settings make the study of social networks particularly interesting for two reasons. 
Firstly, the presence of a border introduces an artificial distance between business partners 
(Parsley and Wei 2001) in a business environment already characterized by high transport 
costs. We therefore assume that local traders will rely heavily on social connections with 
other traders that can provide information on prices and demand, and reduce the uncertainty 
associated with the crossing of national borders. Secondly, border regions are well known for 
providing a favorable environment to informal economic activities, for which the process of 
production and distribution is illicit but the final product is licit (Portes and Haller 2005), 
such as oil or second-hand clothing for example. Borders generate prices differential that well 
connected traders can take advantage of and remain, at the same time, institutional 
asymmetries that have to be negotiated. We therefore assume that local traders will engage in 
interpersonal relationships with state representatives that can facilitate cross-border trade and 
ultimately have a positive effect on economic performance. 
 
Our results show that interactions are particularly frequent with local religious leaders – 
known as marabouts – and with civil servants. In the two border regions surveyed, small 
traders tend to develop fewer ties with politicians or security officers. The paper shows that 
interacting with traditional religious leaders does not have a significant effect on economic 
performance, despite the spiritual importance of such leaders, while support received from 
state representatives and politicians is converted into economic performance. Small traders 
use their connections to actors who have access to state resources or who can help them avoid 
tax and bans on certain products. Geographically, the paper finds significant differences 
between countries, regions and marketplaces. Social connections developed with state 
representatives have a much greater effect on economic performances in Niger and Benin 
than in Nigeria, where average profit is much higher. Experience is more closely correlated 
with profit in the region where traders have developed re-export trade activities than where 
petty trade is the dominant form of business. 
 
The article is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature that analyzes the 
impact of social networks on economic performance. Section 3 presents our methodology and 
describes the two border regions where data was collected. Section 4 starts by describing the 
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main socio-demographic characteristics of the surveyed traders, before determining with 
whom they are connected. We then perform a bivariate analysis between the main sale 
products and profits of the traders and (1) their family background characteristics; (2) their 
social connections. In the rest of the paper, we conduct a multivariate analysis in order to 
identify a network effect on the profit of the traders and study whether there are significant 
differences between countries, regions, and markets. 
 
2. The impact of social networks on economic performance 
 
The study of how social relations affect economic outcomes constitutes a rapidly growing 
field of research in social sciences (Granovetter 2005, Fafchamps 2006), particularly as an 
approach to understanding employment opportunities, professional inequalities, innovation, 
and trade. In developed economies, particular attention has been paid to the role of social 
networks in matching workers and firms in the context of imperfect information on job 
markets. Social networks have proved beneficial for workers, who can obtain information 
about jobs through personal contacts, and for firms, who can reduce uncertainty about 
employees’ actual productivity through references and letters of recommendations (Schmidt 
and Jensen 2012). The economic benefits of social networks are particularly evident for 
highly-qualified workers, whose social connections help them access non-redundant 
information and earn higher wages, and for knowledge-intensive firms competing for a 
limited pool of potential jobseekers (Goyal 2012). These findings obtained in developed 
countries also seem to hold true in the highly fragmented market of Sub-Saharan Africa, 
where a majority of workers are self-employed, have low levels of qualifications, and where 
informal recruitment procedures based on word-of-mouth are dominant. Evidence from South 
Africa (Burns et al. 2010, Hofmeyr 2010, Schöer et al. 2012), Ethiopia (Mano et al. 2011, 
Caria and Hassen 2013), and Burkina-Faso (Nordman and Pasquier-Doumer 2013), among 
others, indicates that social networks enhance employment opportunities. 
 
Social networks also prove effective in shaping the diffusion of new technologies. Rather 
than adopting new technologies randomly or following expert recommendations, early 
adopters often rely on their social networks to evaluate the profitability of innovation. In 
Ethiopia, for example, Matous et al. (2013) show that farmers are more likely to adopt a 
system of production that enhances productivity while preserving the environment if they 
belong to the same ethnic and religious group as the state agent in charge of promoting 
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agricultural change. Studying the process of social learning in the pineapple industry in 
Ghana, Conley and Udry (2010) reach similar findings when they note that novice farmers 
introduce agricultural innovation based on their information neighborhood. In Zimbabwe, 
Chipika and Wilson (2006) find that technological learning, measured through investments in 
R&D, innovation, and quality management, is generally positively associated with 
networking. In a number of small and medium enterprises, however, strong kinship ties have 
a negative effect on technological change, mainly because they prevent manufacturers with a 
low level of education to access external resources, illustrating the Janus face of social 
networks. 
 
In addition to favoring job matching and innovation, social networks can also enhance 
manufacturing and trade. In a study conducted in Nairobi, Kenya, Akoten and Otsuka (2007) 
show that micro-manufacturers who had developed business links with traders are more 
likely to adopt new technologies and to produce higher quality products than those who sold 
directly to consumers. Similar findings were found by Ishiwata et al. (2014) in Ethiopia, who 
show that the density of ties between micro-enterprises affect positively the sales and the 
skills of the manufacturers. In their study of the relationships used by agricultural traders in 
Madagascar, Fafchamps and Minten (1999) also find that more successful traders are better 
connected and make extensive use of embedded ties rather than arm-length transactions. The 
social networks developed among traders enhance productivity by helping them obtaining 
information about prices and market conditions, negotiating and enforcing contracts, 
obtaining loans, ensuring the regularity of trade flows, and reducing risks. In another study 
conducted in Madagascar, Fafchamps and Minten (2002) assess the economic performance of 
traders’ networks, taking into account the possible endogeneity of networks indicators. 
Measuring social capital – defined as “the advantage created by a person’s location in a 
structure of relationships” (Burt 2005: 4) – by the number of contacts with others traders, 
suppliers and clients, they show that these variables positively influence the economic 
performances of the traders, even after controlling for endogeneity and other econometric 
shortcomings. They demonstrate that the main channels through which social capital affects 
traders’ profit are better information on prices, the trustfulness of clients and suppliers, and 
potential access to commercial credit.  
 
Considering the benefits of social networks in economics, one could expect the relation 
between embeddedness and economic success to be linear, with the most connected actors 
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being also the most successful. This linear relation would only be limited by the number of 
stable social relationships that an individual can sustain during his life – known as the 
Dunbar’s number (Hill and Dunbar 2003). However, the building of social ties also entails 
network diseconomies, which explain why the relation between the two variables is non-
linear and follows an inverted U-shape curve (Uzzi 1996). Network diseconomies can be 
explained by the fact that the effects of social networks on economic outcomes do not depend 
only on the number of social connections, but also on the structural position of the actors to 
which one is connected. Social actors can gain power through their ability to be connected to 
a large number of other actors, or to bridge several clusters of actors. In the first instance, the 
most important actors have a high degree centrality, meaning that they are connected to many 
others, whereas the actors bridging clusters have a high betweenness centrality, and are 
usually known as brokers (Burt 1992). 
 
On one hand, central actors intensely embedded in a local cluster of close friends and 
associates are unlikely to be very successful in business, because they lack the brokerage ties 
that could allow them to reach external resources, such as foreign business partners of a 
different ethnic or religious background, for example. They are also vulnerable to social 
obligations, which in Africa are well-known for undermining prosperous businesses or 
prevent enterprising individuals to develop innovative activities (Whitehouse 2012). On the 
other hand, brokers that exclusively rely on external ties are also unlikely to become 
successful entrepreneurs since they lack the internal linkages within local clusters that 
provide the structural basis for trust and solidarity (Wellman 1988). 
 
As a consequence, African entrepreneurs are forced to find a balance between internal 
linkages within their cluster of closely-knitted acquaintances, and brokerage ties built beyond 
their local community (Walther 2014). As Burt (2005: 97) argues, “Brokerage is about 
coordinating people between whom it would be valuable, but risky, to trust. Closure 
[embeddedness according to the author] is about making it safe to trust. The key to creating 
value is to put the two together, building closure around valuable bridge relations”. This 
tradeoff – known as the entrepreneur’s dilemma – appears to be valid in a wide range of 
domains and regions, from apparel firms in the United States (Uzzi 1996) to the shoe and 
garment industry in Nigeria (Meagher 2010), and international trade in Brazzaville 
(Whitehouse 2011). 
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3. Methodology 
 
3.1. Two border regions 
 
In order to test the association between social networks and economic performance, we use 
data from a survey of small traders in two border regions between Benin, Niger, and Nigeria. 
The survey areas are the five border markets of Gaya and Birni N’Konni in Niger, Malanville 
in Benin and Illela and Kamba in Nigeria (Map 1). 
 
Map 1. Location of case studies 
 
Source and cartography: authors 
 
The markets of Gaya, Malanville and Kamba (hereafter GaMaKa), and of Birni N’Konni and 
Illela (BNI) are geographically close to each other (less than 10 km) and form two highly 
integrated markets between which local traders are used to develop business ties (Walther 
2009, 2012). The survey questionnaire was designed to collect information on the social 
network of the traders, and various information on their business, including monthly sales 
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and profit. The sample is made of 358 small traders from these border markets surveyed from 
March to May 2012 (Table 1). 
 
Due to the absence of reliable information on the population of traders in both countries, we 
defined a small trader as a businessman whose annual turnover is smaller than 100 FCFA 
million (€152,000). This amount is widely regarded by local freight agents as a relevant 
threshold between small traders mainly engaged in petty trade and large traders able to 
develop transnational activities. Small traders were selected with a “pseudo-random” 
selection technique: A given number of small traders were assigned to every street in the 
market according to its length and density. For every street, every tenth small trader with a 
fixed position has been selected, in any direction. 
 
Table 1. Allocation of the sample by markets 
Markets Sample size Group markets Sample size 
Gaya 73 GaMaKa 216 
Malanville 79 
Kamba 64 
Birni N’Konni 68 BNI 142 
Illela  74 
Total 358  358 
Source: authors 
 
3.2. Measuring economic performance 
 
Proving a causal relationship between the structure of social networks and economic 
outcomes has proved challenging. On the one hand, social networks can generate externalities 
and improve business performance by enhancing productivity and reducing uncertainty. On 
the other hand, wealthy entrepreneurs can be more connected because they can afford the cost 
of maintaining social connections over the long term, thus attracting a large number of 
dependents which they can control. Studies using relational approaches have tackled this 
issue by looking at differences in social connections within groups in order to understand 
variations in economic behavior across entrepreneurs faced with similar incentives (Goyal 
2012). The idea here is that the social structure – not the attributes of the actors – had direct 
effects on individual behavior. Burt (1992), for example, argues that positions in the social 
structure are the direct cause of the observed outcomes, and not the attributes of the social 
actor, such as age, gender or race. The correlation observed in many developing societies 
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between women (attribute) and lower education (outcomes), for example, is not direct, since 
it is socially mediated by gender relationships (Buchmann et al. 2008). In other words, it is 
not because of their gender that most women are less educated than men, but because the 
relationships between men and women amplify gender differences and ultimately induce a 
lower priority for female education. 
 
The boundaries of social networks are difficult to establish because they usually depend on 
the type and intensity of interactions considered between social agents (Marsden 2012). In 
Africa, this problem is even more accurate due to the fact that social interactions are 
pervasive and kinship relationship, religious or ethnic connections are particularly frequent. 
In the literature, some authors have restricted their study of networks to formal membership, 
family, and kinship (Fafchamps 2004) or have asked the interviewees to name those they 
considered as part of their active network. This last approach suffers from the potential for 
recollection bias and of the fact that the respondent himself determines inclusion criteria. 
 
In this paper, networks are measured with a more neutral procedure. Firstly, using a 
predefined list of given social and administrative positions – including religious leaders, 
police, customs officer, senior civil servant, mayor, and member of parliament – small traders 
were asked to state whether they knew the incumbents of those positions and if yes, whether 
they had ever been in contact with them. Secondly, small traders were asked to name other 
people they considered important for them including family members or relatives. For any 
listed person or position, a set of questions were asked to measure the intensity of the social 
ties. These questions included the frequency of contacts and the benefit of any support or 
advice. Our underlying hypothesis in using this approach was that the performance of a small 
trader as measured by his monthly sales would mostly depend on the quality of his network 
as measured by the social position of the identified members. Finally, detailed socio-
economic information on parents of the traders was collected. These background 
characteristics are used later as covariates during the empirical analysis.  
  
In our survey, the economic performance of small traders is measured by two indicators: the 
monthly sales and the monthly profit as estimated by the traders themselves. Measuring the 
economic indicators of small traders, who usually do not keep account of their income and 
expenditure, is not an easy exercise because of memory biases. This declarative approach has 
nonetheless been widely used in employment surveys to measure the earnings of 
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entrepreneurs and self-employed workers. In our study, the profit and the sales were collected 
based on de Mel et al.’s (2009) approach, who tested the self-reporting of profit through a 
unique question against various alternative methods: detailed reporting of sales and expenses, 
usage of account diaries, etc. Their analyses showed that the declaration of the total profit 
through one unique question was robust compared with alternative methods. Instead of 
collecting the exact amount, enumerators were instructed to collect this information by 
intervals. The use of intervals reduces non response rate given that some traders are reluctant 
to provide the exact amount of their monthly sales and profit. Finally, even if profit and sales 
are subject to measurement errors, these errors do not affect the estimation of regressions 
coefficients, as far as they are not correlated to the explanatory variables (Wooldridge 2002). 
 
3. 3. Empirical method 
 
The article uses both descriptive statistics and multivariate analysis. Descriptive analysis 
relies on univariate and bivariate tables and charts of frequencies and means to provide the 
network profile of small traders and to display a snapshot of profit levels across countries. 
Descriptive statistics are supplemented with multivariate regression analysis. The following 
regression analysis framework was used: 
 
      
              
 
where: P is a monthly profit of the small trader, measured in CFA Francs (100 CFA=0.15€); 
N is a vector of network indicators which captures the family background (father’s job) and 
the set of people that the trader knows and interacts with; X is a vector of other covariates 
which contains traders characteristics (gender, education, experience) and an indicator of the 
goods sold; and i identifies the small trader. The vector of coefficients of interest α captures 
the correlation between profit and network after controlling for the effect of other factors. 
The equation is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). The use of OLS restricts the scope 
of the interpretation of some of our results. The causal link between social networks and 
profit cannot be fully elaborated because of unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality. 
The case for reverse causality is however limited because most small traders suggested 
during the survey that they themselves initiated the contacts with incumbents of listed 
positions. 
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4. Results 
 
4.1. Description of the main variables 
 
The socio-demographic characteristics of our respondents (Table 2) show that small traders 
from the border markets are 35 years old on average. The average age is similar across the 
three countries and reflects the youth of the population involved in small businesses. Most of 
the small traders have spent more than a decade in the activity, particularly in Benin, where 
the average experience in business is over 15 years, compared with an average of 12 years in 
the other two countries. Education levels are extremely low: more than a third (43%) of small 
traders have attended only Koranic school while 15% have attended some primary level of 
schooling. A very limited number of the interviewees attended high school, a business school, 
or university. These results are congruent with adult literacy rates calculated at the national 
level, which indicate that only 28.7% of the population aged 15 and older had the ability to 
read and write in Niger (2005-10), 42.4% in Benin, and 61.3% in Nigeria (UNDP 2013). 
 
Table 2. Main socio-demographic characteristics of the interviewees 
 Total Niger Nigeria Benin BNI GaMaKa 
Sample size (n) 358 141 138 79 142 216 
Age 35.48 34.70  35.94  36.08  35.39 35.54 
Experience 12.90 11.89  12.59  15.23  13.01 12.82 
Education level       
None 0.09 0.12 0.02 0.18 0.05 0.13 
Koranic only 0.43 0.46  0.42  0.41  0.50 0.39 
Primary 0.15  0.19  0.11  0.16  0.13 0.17 
Secondary 0.27  0.21  0.36  0.22  0.27 0.26 
University 0.05  0.02  0.09  0.04  0.06 0.05 
Father’s profession       
Agriculture 0.46  0.51  0.38  0.48  0.49 0.43 
Trader 0.33  0.28  0.37  0.32  0.35 0.32 
Other activity  0.22 0.21 0.25 0.20  0.16 0.25 
Previous activity in trade 0.51  0.39  0.43  0.39  0.39 0.61 
Source: authors 
 
Almost half (46%) of the small traders interviewed came from farming families. This is 
particularly visible in Niger (51%) and Benin (48%), where agriculture is the predominant 
activity of 60% and 43% of the employed population respectively, according to current 
World Bank (2014) national indicators. A third of the traders’ parents (32%) in the sample 
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are also traders. This proportion is slightly higher in Nigeria (37%) which is a more business-
oriented country and slightly lower in Niger (28%) where employment in farming is more 
common. Parents of one fourth of traders in the sample are involved in various forms of 
activities in the nonagricultural sector, including civil servants. 
 
4.2. Importance of social networks 
 
The social networks were measured with a parsimonious approach aiming at identifying a 
small set of important individuals to the traders. Our results indicate that small traders know 
on average two people listed as incumbents in a social or administrative position (Table 3). 
The most prominent social position is the Islamic spiritual and political teacher, known as 
marabout in North and West Africa (Butler 2006), which was cited by 46% of the traders. 
More than 54% of the traders located in Benin and Niger reported connections with a 
marabout, compared with 31% for the traders based in Nigeria, where a larger proportion of 
traders are Christian Igbo from the South of Nigeria. The next position is occupied by senior 
civil servants, with whom about 40% of the traders in the sample interact. Civil servants are 
more involved among Nigerian small traders (46%) than those of Niger (33%).The following 
positions are police officers (24%), gendarmes and mayors (21% each). 
 
To our surprise, connections with customs officer were only reported by one tenth of the 
traders. Given the fact that the surveyed markets are close to national borders, where informal 
transactions are conducted between traders and custom authorities, we would have expected 
higher level of interactions between these actors. One possible explanation may be related to 
the scale of activities of the surveyed small traders, who are more likely to buy goods from 
the local market than large traders engaged in frequent negotiations with customs officers. 
Another explanation could lie in the fact that custom officers are frequently rotated between 
border posts in order to prevent corruptive activities and have not the time to establish long-
term informal relationships with small traders. The average number of monthly contacts with 
the incumbent of a given position aligns with their social importance: the officials that were 
most frequently cited as connections are also those that are more frequently contacted. A 
marabout is contacted an average of 12 times per month, a civil servant 10 times per month, 
while customs officers have infrequent interactions with small traders. 
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During the survey, information on the type of support (if any) solicited from the network was 
also collected. The results confirm that small traders do rely on their network (Table 3). Six 
out of ten have received support or advice from one of the incumbent listed in our survey. A 
large majority (82%) of small traders knows at least one person with a higher socio-economic 
position and 61% have received support or advice from them. 
 
Table 3. Social networks of small traders 
 All Niger Nigeria Benin BNI GaMaKa 
Sample size (n) 358 141 138 79 142 216 
Socio-economic position       
Police officer 0.24 0.31 0.20 0.16 0.16 0.27 
Gendarme 0.21 0.28 0.14 0.20 0.20 0.22 
Custom officer 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.10 
Senior civil servant 0.40 0.33 0.46 0.42 0.37 0.42 
Marabout 0.46 0.54 0.31 0.57 0.34 0.54 
MP/ Minister/Head of Department 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.09 
Mayor/chief of small town, village 0.21 0.30 0.15 0.14 0.19 0.22 
International migrant 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.12 
Other important person known 0.15 0.06 0.30 0.04 0.13 0.17 
Average number of persons known 2.05 2.23 1.91 1.99 1.74 2.26 
Knows at least one person 0.82 0.81 0.83 0.81 0.78 0.84 
Ever receive support from:       
Police officer 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.09 
Gendarme 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.09 
Custom officer 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Senior civil servant 0.21 0.16 0.27 0.19 0.18 0.23 
Marabout 0.37 0.41 0.27 0.49 0.25 0.45 
Deputy/ Minister/ Head of Department 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.05 
Mayor/chief of small town, village 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.12 
International migrant 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.05 
Other important person known 0.13 0.05 0.25 0.04 0.11 0.14 
Ever receive support from at least one person 0.61 0.58 0.64 0.59 0.54 0.65 
Average number of contacts per month with:       
Police officer 4.68 5.71 5.20 1.93 2.41 6.17 
Gendarme 5.42 7.81 2.58 6.13 2.26 7.50 
Custom officer 2.58 4.19 1.68 1.27 1.25 3.45 
Senior civil servant 9.78 8.60 11.19 9.44 5.46 12.62 
Marabout 11.99 12.92 9.86 14.06 5.56 16.22 
Deputy/ Minister/ Head of Department 4.88 7.17 3.55 3.13 1.41 7.16 
Mayor/chief of small town, village 9.27 14.04 5.78 6.87 4.81 12.20 
International migrant 4.04 4.55 3.37 4.29 1.73 5.55 
Other important person known 6.95 4.38 13.37 0.31 3.15 9.44 
Sources: authors 
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Small traders request support more frequently from marabouts (37%) and senior civil servants 
(21%). Police and other security officers are less solicited. Marabouts play a key role for 
small traders most often in Benin (49%) and Niger (41%), whereas in Nigeria, marabouts and 
civil servants are equally solicited for support. 
 
4.3. Bivariate analysis 
 
This section presents the correlation between business characteristics, measured through sales 
and profit, and some of the trader’s characteristics, in particular their father’s occupation. It is 
anticipated that family background and the current network will be correlated. The 
multivariate regression analysis used later allows us to investigate conditional correlations. 
 
In the sample, 33% of the small traders are sons of traders, whereas this proportion is 46% for 
the sons of farmers. Parents help their offspring in different ways. They can encourage and 
train them to sell goods, connect them to potential customer, or provide capital. During the 
survey, data were collected on the main products sold by small traders and their sales. The 
biographies show that many traders did not change their main sale products over time. Figure 
1 displays the main product sold by the small traders according to their father’s occupation. It 
suggests that, being the son of a trader is not a clear predictor of the type of good sold by a 
small businessman, even if sons of traders tend to have higher monthly profit. 
 
Figure 1. Mains sale product by father’s occupation 
 
Sources: authors.  
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Table 4 shows that the average monthly profit of small traders whose father himself was a 
trader is around 150 000 CFA (€229). It is higher and less dispersed compared to the monthly 
profit of children of other family background. On average, a small trader earns about 92,000 
FCFA (€140) a month in Niger, 168,000 FCFA (€256) in Nigeria and 112,000 FCFA (€170) 
in Benin
1
. Given that most traders do not need fixed capital nor do they have fixed cost in 
their business, we might use the sales to proxy for their capital (most of them run very low 
level of inventories). Here as well, sons of traders tend to run higher level of capital as proxy 
for monthly sales. Breaking statistics by country, the pattern is very pronounced in Niger, 
where traders whose father was also in the trade business have monthly sales of more than 
100,000 FCFA (€152) higher than average traders.  
 
Table 4. Trader’s average monthly profit by father’s background, FCFA 
Country   Farmer Trader Wage-Earner 
Other self-
employed Total 
Niger Mean 84,015 117,353 89,167 57,143 92,320 
 Sd. 79,150 73,806 64,563 35,339 75,136 
 N 66 34 18 7 125 
Nigeria Mean 136,981 189,722 180,500 185,500 168,029 
 Sd. 94,240 79,053 93,703 70,672 87,914 
 N 53 54 10 20 137 
Benin Mean 109,219 99,412 122,000 142,000 112,734 
 Sd. 85,243 77,578 95,629 80,836 82,553 
 N 32 17 5 10 64 
Total Mean 107,947 151,667 121,818 149,459 128,144 
 Sd. 88,574 86,154 86,619 82,897 88,995 
 N 151 105 33 37 326 
Sources: authors 
 
In what follows, we wish to determine whether the average monthly profit of traders is 
positively or negatively affected by the people with whom they are connected. Table 5 shows 
that interacting with marabouts has a detrimental effect, unlike having connections with other 
categories of actors, which offers a premium of about 25,000 FCFA (€38). This is a quite 
important difference since it represents approximately the monthly minimum wage in West 
Africa. It is in Niger and Benin that the social ties with senior, political and security officers 
make a larger difference (more than 25,000 FCFA) whereas the difference is only 10,000 
FCFA (€15) in Nigeria. 
                                                          
1
 These raw figures should be interpreted with caution since they depend on a number of factors which are not 
controlled for. 
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Table 5. Average sales by father’s background, FCFA 
Country   Farmer Trader Wage-Earner 
Other self-
employed Total 
Niger Mean 500,074 644,545 474,474 414,286 529,055 
 Sd. 534,065 475,155 423,615 235,786 492,359 
 N 68 33 19 7 127 
Nigeria Mean 1,035,660 1,228,704 1,241,500 1,253,571 1,159,275 
 Sd. 562,724 474,923 552,469 467,860 518,771 
 N 53 54 10 21 138 
Benin Mean 583,182 577,222 605,000 680,000 597,879 
 Sd. 508,303 555,553 552,381 479,699 509,732 
 N 33 18 5 10 66 
Total Mean 702,208 933,429 719,265 948,026 805,529 
 Sd. 588,469 573,215 580,718 556,424 588,077 
 N 154 105 34 38 331 
Sources: authors 
 
Because of the border location of the markets, we are also interested in investigating whether 
the social ties developed with representatives of the state have an effect on small traders’ 
business activities. In order to do that, we disaggregate the social network of small traders 
into three categories of state representatives: senior civil servants, politicians and security 
officers, which may include custom officers, gendarmes and police officers. These latter 
actors are officially in charge of security, law and rules enforcement but can also ease 
smuggling of goods across the borders and hence favor the traders with whom they interact. 
 
Our analyses presented in Table 6 show, however, that the security officers are not the most 
profitable contacts with whom small traders work. Indeed, when considering all countries 
together, small traders in relationship with a senior civil servant gain about 159,000 FCFA 
(€242), compared to 152,000 FCFA (€231) for those in relationship with a politician and a 
little less for small traders who received support from security officers. This pattern varies 
across countries. In Niger, a connection with a senior civil servant is the most rewarding, 
followed by a connection with a security officer, whereas being in relationship with a 
politician is less rewarding. In Benin, things are reversed since being in a politician’s network 
yields much more returns, followed by security officer and lastly, senior civil servant. In 
Nigeria, there is no difference between being connected to a politician or to a security officer 
and the most profitable connection is to a senior civil servant, which corresponds to an 
additional gain of 13,000 FCFA (€20). 
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Table 6. Average monthly profit by type of support, FCFA 
  Total Niger Nigeria Benin 
Marabout 124,008 92,596 169,189 122,973 
Senior civil servant 158,819 128,095 189,054 125,000 
Politician 151,875 106,111 177,667 214,286 
Security officer 150,870 120,000 176,667 177,000 
Total 128,144 92,320 168,029 112,734 
Sources: authors 
 
4.4. Multivariate analysis of profit 
 
The bivariate analysis has indicated some correlations between profit and a set of network 
indicators, especially in Niger and Benin. However, we cannot draw conclusions regarding 
the effect of the network based only on this descriptive analysis because profits are likely to 
be influenced by other factors as well. Therefore, we turn to multivariate analysis in order to 
evaluate which of the social and economic characteristics of small traders have a significant 
influence on their business activities. 
 
Table 7.1 presents our estimated parameters. For each country and for the overall sample, we 
estimate two sets of regressions based on the categories of actors previously defined 
(marabout, senior civil servant, politician, security officer) and discuss the statistically 
significant coefficients. The estimations confirm what has already been previously 
highlighted: for small traders of Niger and Benin, being connected to a representative of the 
police, customs or political sphere is valuable. In Niger, the actors connected to such agents 
gain 34,000 FCFA (€52) more than those which are not connected, while in Benin, the 
premium associated with such connections is twice as high. Being in connection with a 
marabout still has a negative impact on small traders’ profit, but the effect is not statistically 
significant. 
 
More generally, our findings show that the impact of the network on the economic 
performance of small traders depends on the type of person with whom they are connected, 
suggesting that some social ties are far from being efficient from a purely business point of 
view. 
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Table 7.1. Estimated regression coefficients, according to countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES All-1 All-2 Niger-1 Niger-2 Nigeria-1 Nigeria-2 Benin-1 Benin-2 
         
Experience 2,121*** 2,161*** 1,840** 1,952** 1,639 1,691* 2,230 1,281 
 (596.6) (599.9) (827.1) (827.9) (996.8) (1,003) (1,372) (1,352) 
Koranic education -13,007 -14,844 -22,305 -24,305 -14,047 -15,771 -25,437 -22,047 
 (16,979) (17,021) (20,052) (20,185) (51,689) (52,195) (30,394) (29,208) 
Primary education -25,819 -27,316 -22,504 -22,536 -11,614 -15,507 -50,252 -36,166 
 (19,849) (19,856) (24,253) (24,080) (55,343) (56,116) (35,712) (34,701) 
Secondary or 
university education 
15,123 12,805 -12,630 -14,837 11,630 9,993 -16,357 -11,063 
 (18,191) (18,309) (24,008) (23,937) (50,954) (51,792) (35,061) (33,912) 
Father farmer -17,907 -20,018 7,927 2,844 -37,914* -41,713** -16,026 -29,072 
 (12,597) (12,536) (17,940) (17,622) (20,215) (20,785) (25,523) (24,599) 
Father trader 25,027* 23,673* 48,954*
* 
44,646*
* 
11,239 7,457 -20,844 -27,030 
 (13,064) (13,123) (19,766) (19,590) (19,799) (20,475) (28,660) (28,187) 
Support from 
marabout 
-9,610 -10,758 -8,659 -9,181 1,069 1,080 -6,883 -5,136 
 (9,910) (9,977) (13,996) (14,156) (16,803) (16,949) (23,551) (22,447) 
Support from civil 
servant 
 32,263***  39,619*
* 
 24,238  6,758 
  (11,760)  (18,894)  (17,489)  (25,224) 
Support from 
politician 
 14,991  4,961  -13,593  92,209*** 
  (15,022)  (20,236)  (25,381)  (33,336) 
Support from security 
officer 
 22,946*  25,274  11,320  65,863** 
  (13,903)  (18,273)  (25,244)  (26,976) 
Constant 97,321**
* 
100,486**
* 
62,578*
* 
66,296*
* 
153,875**
* 
157,190**
* 
95,308* 114,397** 
 (21,670) (21,526) (26,947) (26,544) (51,381) (52,229) (48,581) (46,202) 
         
Observations 326 326 125 125 137 137 64 64 
R-squared 0.135 0.145 0.135 0.163 0.116 0.127 0.237 0.324 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: authors 
 
That is particularly the case of being in relationship with a marabout, which doesn’t provide 
great financial benefit but is nevertheless actively sought by small traders for spiritual 
reasons. As religious leaders and advisors, marabouts play a key role in West African 
economics where trade and Muslim faith have, since precolonial times, been closely 
associated (Lydon 2009). They are frequently visited by traders, because they are supposed to 
intercede with God, and can potentially favor the prosperity of economic enterprises. Traders 
also visit marabouts to seek forces to ward or heal themselves against misfortunes, occult 
threats and attacks. Some individual in the studied regions consider persistent misfortune and 
affliction to be the result of malevolent supernatural occult powers in their lives. Seeking 
marabout’s protection induces financial cost that in some case represents up to 46% of total 
monthly expenditures (LeMay-Boucher et al. 2013). The use of – and expenses related to – 
marabouts is increasingly criticized by Islamic reform movements, such as the Society for the 
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Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition (locally known as Izala) to which 
many local traders belong (Kane 2003). 
 
Other network relations are always associated with positive outcomes, even if this effect is 
not always statistically significant. The positive effect of connections to politicians or senior 
civil servants can be explained by a conversion of social capital to economic capital: in these 
countries, small traders that are connected with politicians and senior civil servants can call 
on their financial support to increase the scope of their activities. In some cases, traders and 
politicians or senior civil servants can even be partners, the latter providing funds and the 
former investing these funds. Given that they are in charge of enforcing law and rules related 
to trade, other state representatives can use their position to favor traders with whom they are 
in contact. As to family background, there seems to be a leverage effect of family tradition in 
trade in Niger and Nigeria. Those whose fathers were also traders lead more profitable 
businesses than those whose fathers are involved in agriculture, or even other non-farm 
activities in the specific case of Niger. When children perform the same activity as their 
fathers, they can benefit from specific “know how” linked to that activity (Pasquier-Doumer 
2012). This intergenerational transmission of experiences is not significant in Benin. 
 
Surprisingly, education level, which is an important determinant of individual productivity, 
has no significant impact on business profit in any of the countries. Having attended school 
does not seem to help in informal trade of the border regions of Niger, Benin and Nigeria. 
This result challenges those founded by Kuepié et al. (2009) who showed that education was 
still rewarding even in the informal labor market of some of the capital cities of West 
African. The fact that education doesn’t contribute to economic performance is a matter of 
concern since it’s an important component of human capital, which is known to be an engine 
of economic growth. The absence of this effect could be the result of the discrepancy between 
the training received and the abilities required for trade. The other human capital factor, work 
experience, has a positive impact on informal trade, except in Benin. 
 
So far, our analysis has mainly documented the consequences of social relations for economic 
outcomes in the countries where small traders were surveyed. In what follows, we look at the 
estimated regression coefficients in the two border regions surveyed and in each border 
market individually. The rationale behind this analysis is that some regions or market places 
may have unique characteristics, which can positively or negatively influence trade activities. 
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The first two columns of Table 7.2 investigate the market place effect. The reference market 
of the regression is Birni N’Konni in Niger, the most populous market. Thus compared to this 
market, all else being equal, small traders located in the two Nigerian border markets of Illela 
and Kamba have significantly higher monthly profits. Small traders located in Gaya and 
Malanville have similar level of monthly profits. This feature is maintained when additional 
network variables are accounted for, as presented in the second column. 
 
Table 7.2. Estimated regression coefficients according to regions and markets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES All All BNI BNI GaMaKa GaMaKa 
       
Experience as trader 1,671*** 1,895*** 1,425 1,650* 1,806** 2,087*** 
 (578.1) (569.3) (864.3) (870.2) (781.5) (769.0) 
Koranic education -32,514* -32,265** 24,427 25,272 -52,514*** -52,526*** 
 (16,566) (16,232) (31,407) (31,269) (19,839) (19,421) 
Primary education -38,671** -37,259** 23,187 14,231 -58,776** -52,843** 
 (18,990) (18,575) (35,544) (35,356) (22,999) (22,562) 
Secondary or university education -11,631 -14,319 36,279 32,658 -24,611 -26,841 
 (17,823) (17,577) (32,843) (32,887) (21,942) (21,579) 
Father farmer -23,544** -20,356* -34,320* -26,644 -18,381 -15,170 
 (11,943) (11,700) (19,283) (19,428) (15,609) (15,314) 
Father trader 14,166 16,397 -1,303 3,946 21,598 24,320 
 (12,472) (12,219) (20,304) (20,385) (15,941) (15,636) 
Support from security officer  32,669**  52,355*  26,244* 
  (12,964)  (27,027)  (15,200) 
Support from civil servant and or 
politician 
 28,055***  24,475  31,024** 
  (10,050)  (15,964)  (13,285) 
Support from marabout  1,348  2,269  58.96 
  (9,642)  (16,546)  (12,078) 
Gaya -7,024 -13,155     
 (14,675) (14,440)     
Illela 69,427*** 70,127***     
 (14,064) (13,901)     
Kamba 58,165*** 51,919***     
 (14,675) (14,429)     
Malanville 9,291 4,431     
 (14,427) (14,277)     
Nigeria   68,409*** 70,741*** 66,380*** 65,794*** 
   (14,273) (14,500) (15,456) (15,175) 
Benin     16,131 16,969 
     (14,897) (14,660) 
Constant 109,339*** 94,731*** 71,938** 53,706 111,043*** 89,799*** 
 (22,712) (22,719) (36,042) (37,177) (24,559) (25,289) 
       
Observations 326 326 135 135 191 191 
R-squared 0.221 0.263 0.239 0.277 0.223 0.269 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: authors 
 
The next columns of Table 7.2 investigate some specificity of the two border regions, 
GaMaKa and BNI. They highlight the regional uniqueness of some links between social 
networks and profit. The results indicate that the importance of interaction with civil servants 
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and politicians prevails within the groups of markets. The striking difference between them is 
on experience as trader. While experience is not related to profit in BNI, it is positively 
correlated to profit in the GaMaKa region. This correlation may be related to the historical 
development of trade between the markets of Gaya, Malanville and Kamba, which originated 
in the 1980s following the liberalization of international exchanges. This period was 
favorable to the development of re-export trade of second-hand textiles, which were imported 
free of custom duties through the port of Cotonou in Benin, transported by trucks to the 
markets of Malanville or Gaya, from which they were then illegally exported to Nigeria, 
where their import is banned (Walther 2009). The revenues generated by such trade have 
contributed to the creation of a diaspora of foreign traders in the GaMaKa region, which 
contrasts with the autochthonous business community of Birni N’Konni and Illela. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we used firsthand data collected in five borders market located between Niger, 
Nigeria and Benin to investigate the role of social network on small business performances as 
measured by monthly profits. 
 
The analysis shows that more than a third of the small traders surveyed interact with local 
religious leaders (marabouts) or civil servants, whereas contacts with politicians or security 
officers are less frequent (one tenth). Small traders receive various form of support from 
these categories of actors. The support received from civil servants, politicians, and security 
authorities is converted into economic performance. This conversion is channeled through 
two mechanisms: the mobilization of financial capital through connections to actors who 
have access to state resources and the non-compliance to law and rules concerning taxes or 
bans on certain products thanks to the collusion with security authorities. Interactions with 
traditional religious leaders have no significant effect on economic performance, despite the 
spiritual importance of these actors. We also found that education, widely regarded as an 
important determinant of productivity and income, does not have a significant impact on 
traders’ economic performance. This result could be the reflection of a misalignment between 
education curricula and the need of labor market. On contrary, work experience prove to have 
a positive impact on the traders’ profit. 
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Our study also shows that geographic space is a determinant of business activities. Social 
connections developed with state representatives have much more effect on economic 
performances in Niger and Benin than in Nigeria, where only the professional experience and 
the family background of small traders actually influence their economic performance. The 
fact that social networks pay off, at least in Benin and Niger, reflects, to a certain extent, 
market imperfections in accessing credit, and in enforcing rules and laws. As a consequence, 
those who can rely on an effective network are better off than those left out. By providing 
access to capital, suppliers and customers, and reducing transaction costs, social networks 
facilitate the development of flexible and informal ties between West African businessmen. 
They are, however, not frictionless, and can also hamper the evolution of business, because 
deeply embedded actors are often conservative about whom they do business with, which can 
make it hard for newcomers to enter a market and bring new ideas. In the two regions 
studied, the effectiveness of social network can be considered a source of inequality and a 
distortion to a fair competition, which could incite Niger and Benin authorities to set up 
adapted policy measures to make the labor market functioning with less distortion.  
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